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This paper begins with the hypothesis that
large economic fluctuations, the marked
changes in the unemployment that character-
ize market economies, are a consequence of
problems of adjustment to disturbances, es-
pecially adjustments of wages and prices. Two
strands of work have addressed these problems
of adjustment. One focuses on rigidities:
downward rigidities in wages are at the center
of traditional Keynesian models. The other fo-
cuses on the consequences of rapid changes,
particularly in asset prices, in the context of
markets with incomplete contracting {imper-
fect indexing) and imperfect capital markets.
While the second tradition traces its origins at
least back to Irving Fisher's debt-deflation
theories, it has been revived in the new-
Keynesian work of Bruce Greenwald and
Stiglitz (1988. 1989, 1990b, 1993, 1995) and
others. The fact that wages and prices did fall
dramatically in the Great Depression (by more
than a third in the United States) provided
some of the impetus to the latter theory. The
major economic downturn this year in East
Asia, with unemployment in Indonesia soaring
from 4.7 percent to 14.3 percent and output
falling by at least 16 percent, was accompa-
nied by huge changes in prices: over the first
year of the crisis, the current best estimate is
that Indonesian real wages fell by 40-60 per-
cent (Worid Bank. 1998 p. 105). This result,
I would argue, is better interpreted through the
second strand of thought.
I. Asymmetries in Adjustment Speeds
This paper carries the analysis one step fur-
ther. It argues that, because different prices
* World Bank, Washington. IX: 20433; on leave from
Stanford University. The views expressed are solely those
of the author and do not necessarily represent those of any
organization with which he is or has been affiliated. This
paper is based on joint research with Bruce Greenwald.
(including prices of labor and capital) are de-
termined in different ways, shocks lead to
marked changes in relative prices, and those
disturbances in relative prices greatly exacer-
bate economic fluctuations. The determination
of asset prices is often best described by the
auction markets emphasized in traditional eco-
nomics texts. These prices adjust quickly; and
because the value of assets today depends on
expectations of future values, current prices
can be highly volatile, as those expectations
change. On the other hand, prices of most
products, wages, and bank interest rates are set
by firms (and banks), albeit in the context of
markets. Firms face downward-sloping de-
mand curves for their products in the short run
and upward-sloping supply curves for factors.
These slopes can be explained in part by im-
perfections in competition due to product dif-
ferentiation or to the small number of firms in
the market and in part by information
imperfections.
The importance of downward-sloping prod-
uct demand (at least in the short run) has been
brought home forcefully by the recent crisis in
East Asia. Consider the example of Thailand,
which, with less than 1 percent of world GDP,
is a small player in the world economy. Under
standard theory, it would face a horizontal de-
mand curve for its products; certainly a 30-
percent real devaluation should lead to huge
increases in the demand for its products. Ex-
ports would quickly fill up any loss in domes-
tic demand. Yet in fact, tbe value of Thai
exports actually declined in the aftermath of
the crisis (Greenwald, 1998).
For price- and wage-setting firms, the con-
sequences of changes in prices and wages
are uncertain, not only because prices and
wages have to be set before demand and sup-
ply curves are fully known, but also because
the reactions of other agents in the market
are uncertain. The uncertainty arises for two
reasons: first, because changes in a firm's
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FIGURE I. PRICE VERSUS QuANrrrv ADJUSTMENT
Notes: If there is a shift in the demand curve, either price
or quantities musi change. The smaller the adjustment of
prices, the larger is the adjustment of quantities. With un-
certainty in the demand curve, different adjustments in
prices impose different risks on the firm.
circumstances (including the signals they re-
ceive) are only imperfectly known by other
firms; and second, because firms receiving
the same information or the same shocks will
react differently, depending on their circum-
stances and characteristics (which are not
common knowledge) . Both because of
agency problems and imperfections of cap-
ital markets, which lead to firms acting in a
risk-averse manner (Greenwald and Stiglitz,
1990a), firms are sensitive to the risks as-
sociated with different decisions. The prob-
lem of price- and wage-setting thus should
be approached within a standard dynamic
portfolio model, one that takes into account
the risks associated with each decision, the
nonreversibilities, as well as the adjustment
costs associated with both prices and quan-
tities (see Fig. 1). My earlier papers (with
Greenwald) have argued that (a) the risks
associated with wage and price adjustments
may well be larger than those associated
with output adjustments, at least for goods
that could be stored; and (b) there were fixed
costs associated with hiring and firing, and
those costs were often asymmetric. These
asymmetries helped explain the pattern of
hours and employment over the cycle, with
increases in hours (entailing high overtime
payments) typically preceding increases in
employment, and with labor-shedding typi-
cally lagging downturns (giving rise to the
phenomenon described as labor-hoarding).
In the following sections. I look more
closely at the price-setting process, providing
further insights into why prices exhibit rigid-
ities and why different prices may adjust at
different rates. I then explore the conse-
quences of asymmetric price responses.
n. Signaling and Rigidities
Earlier analyses explained why the level of
wages or prices might affect the quality of the
labor hired or of the good purchased. These
effects have profound implications for the
shape of the demand and supply curves, and
they imply that wages and prices may not ad-
just to market-clearing levels. Here, however,
the concem is with how economies respond to
shocks. Efficiency-wage theories, for instance,
argue that, while real wages may not adjust to
a change in the supply of labor, they will typ-
ically change in response to other changes in
economic circumstances, including informa-
tion (e.g.. about the productivity of workers).
In a dynamic economy, changes in prices and
wages may convey information, about both the
characteristics of a firm and changes in those
characteristics. For instance, if a firm responds
quickly to the lowering of prices by a com-
petitor, this action may convey information
about the firm's willingness to meet or its abil-
ity to withstand competition. By the same to-
ken, given asymmetries of information about
a firm's balance sheet, large changes in prices
may convey information of particular impor-
tance to a firm's creditors (e.g., that the firm
needs to liquefy assets quickly). (Firms facing
the threat of bankruptcy are often forced to
engage in quick inventory reductions; the fact
that the signal is costly makes it a very effec-
tive signal.) It is the change in observable be-
havior that conveys information.
The information conveyed by changes in
prices is all the greater when there are costs to
changing prices, as in the menu-cost literature.
In this case, the change conveys information
that the shock to the environment (e.g., to the
net worth of the firm) is greater than some crit-
ical threshold level.
Signaling theories thus suggest that, to the
extent that it is changes in behavior that con-
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. KtNKED DEMAND CURVES
Noies: Conventional search models give rise to firms fac-
ing kinked demand curves. The gains to lowering prices
may be markedly lower than the losses from raising prices.
vey relevant information, there will be strong
rigidities in variables that are publicly observ-
able. While inventories and much of the inter-
nal workings of firms are not observable, by
their very nature, prices have to be at least par-
tially observable to outsiders (to those engag-
ing in the trade). Similarly, layoffs may
convey a strong signal, especially to other
workers at the firm, that may induce those not
laid off to commence searching for altemative
employment. The recognition that various ac-
tions can convey information may provide an
incentive for secrecy and for fimis to take ac-
tions to otherwise obfuscate signals and their
interpretations. Like other attempts to block
information flows, this practice may interfere
with overall economic efficiency (see Aaron
S. Edlin and StigUtz, 1995).
Much of the signal is related to deviations
from norms. That is, if all firms are increasing
prices by 3 percent, or if the firm has always
increased its price in line with the rate of in-
flation, then deviations from either norm will
convey information about the changed circum-
stances of the firm. Since norms can differ in
different countries and can change dramati-
cally, it may be difficult to relate price-setting
processes just to fundamentals.
The state of the economy may affect the in-
formation conveyed by a particular action,
causing more rigidities in some circumstances
than others. Thus, if the state of the economy
is such that bankruptcy is a real danger, a firm
may have a strong incentive to avoid signaling
that it faces a higher probability of bankruptcy;
as a result, prices may be relatively rigid in
this situation. On the other hand, if the state of
the economy is such that most firms are mark-
edly decreasing prices, then the signal con-
veyed by a price decrease by a firm may be
weaker, and it could simply be interpreted as
reflecting lower costs of production or an ef-
fective response to competitive pressures.
Firms may, of course, be uncertain about the
full implications of signals conveyed by wage
and price changes, including how comi>etitor
finns, customers, or suppliers (including cred-
itors) will respond to those changes. This risk,
combined with firm risk aversion, reinforces
the reluctance to change prices.
m . Search and Rigidities
Search is costly, and the extent of search
depends on i)erceptions of whether the offered
price (wage, interest rate) deviates from that
being offered by others. Elsewhere (Stiglitz,
1987), I have shown that this can give rise to
a kinked demand curve in product markets.
The reasoning is as follows: When a fimi
raises its price (by more than the "norm"),
the firm's customers immediately know it and
are induced to search for altemative suppliers.
But if it lowers its price, then unless it expends
resources on advertising, its action induces no
new customers to launch a search; and while
it will glean more customers (as those cur-
rently searching are more likely to settle on
this firm), the increased sales under plausible
conditions will be markedly less than the loss
in sales from price increases (see Fig. 2). Sim-
ilar arguments hold in other markets. The lo-
cation of the kink and how it changes over
time depend on expectations. If most individ-
uals expect most firms to be adjusting prices
with inflation, and if there are shared views
about the rate of inflation, then the price at the
kink will move up with inflation: only devia-
tions from expectations (from the norm) give
rise to search. Norms can change and change
quickly.
The consequences of actions are not only
uncertain, but they can also not be costlessly
reversed: it will be costly to recruit back a cus-
tomer who has found another supplier or a
good worker who has found another employer.
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Together, risk and adjustment costs imply that
there may be an option value in delaying wage
decreases and price increases, which gives rise
to further rigidities in price-setting in markets.
IV. Uncertainty and the Wage- and
Price-Setting Process
In the price-setting sectors of the economy,
differences in the implied risk aversion of
firms (resulting in part from differences in net
worth) lead to differences across firms in price
and wage responses to similar shocks. This in-
creases the possibility that different wages and
prices will adjust differently in response to
shocks to the economy. This effect is, of
course, exacerbated by shocks that have large
and differential effects on the net worth of
different firms. On the other hand, greater
uncertainty may lead to more risk-averse be-
havior on the part of firms, thus contributing
to greater wage and price rigidities (i.e.,
smaller deviations from perceived norms of
adjustments).
Ex ante, it is not possible to ascertain which
effect will predominate. But large shocks, such
as those facing East Asia, are more likely to
result in a change in norms; and indeed, these
markets have been characterized by rapidly
falling wages and prices. This is especially the
case in Indonesia, where it has been estimated
that almost two-thirds of the firms are bank-
rupt; thus the marginal adverse signaling effect
of lowering one's price may, at this juncture,
be minimal.
V. Interactions between Asymmetries in
Responses and Imperfections in Information
The rapid response of asset prices and in-
terest rates to shocks, combined with the im-
perfections in capital markets that limit the
ability of firms to divest themselves of risks,
and with the imperfect indexing of debt con-
tracts, has profound implications for the econ-
omy's aggregate supply curve. The net worth
of firms can change very quickly {Greenwald
and Stiglitz, 1993). With risk-averse firms and
imperfect risk markets, decreases in net worth
lead to large leftward shifts in supply curves.
Moreover, the concavity of the supply func-
tions implies that even in a closed economy.
where producers of a given product gain from
a price rise what purchasers lose, large price
changes have macroeconomic effects. Again,
East Asia provides an illustration of the phe-
nomenon, as well as a confirmation of the pre-
dictions of the theory. There, the increases in
interest rates, which were both unexpected and
very large, quickly eroded the net worth of the
already highly indebted firms. They also re-
duced net worth through another channel;
many firms held substantial wealth in the form
of assets like land and stock in other firms, the
value of which was adversely affected by the
increased interest rates and the associated eco-
nomic decline. More broadly, to know the im-
pact of a shock on the net worth of any firm
requires enormous infonnation, not only about
its asset position, but also about the adjust-
ments in prices of the goods it sells and the
factors it purchases. A full accounting of net
worth requires not only knowing the value of
those variables today, but also an estimate of
how they will move through time. The larger
the disturbance to the economy, the greater the
uncertainty.
if all wages and prices were to fall propor-
tionately, matters would be grave enough. But
in the previous section, I argued nol only that
different prices are determined by different ad-
justment mechanisms, but also that for wage-
and price-setting firms, patterns of adjustment
of their wages and prices will depend on fac-
tors idiosyncratic to each firm (such as the
change in its net worth and its implicit degree
of risk aversion). Therefore prices and wages
do not all fall proportionately. And even if
there were indexed debt contracts (so that in-
terest rates adjusted to changes in inflation or
deflation), different firms would still find their
net worth affected differently, and relative
prices could deviate significantly from those
associated with traditional equilibrium theo-
ries, which ignored these effects. Because
interest-rate increases have such a large impact
on asset values and on the dynamics of ad-
justment, the large increases in interest rates
lead to marked increases in uncertainty.
Increased uncertainty and lower net worth
affect the macroeconomy through several
channels: through the decreased willingness of
risk-averse firms to hire labor, to hold inven-
tories, to produce (except in response to or-
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ders). or to invest. At the same time, agency
problems in the economy are likely to in-
crease, one consequence of which is that credit
flows get choked off. Aggregate demand and
supply are both adversely affected.
Reduced credit flows reinforce all of these
effects. Consider trade credit. Firms can
be viewed as engaged in both "production"
and "financial" activities. Their reduced net
worth makes them less willing and able to
absorb risk. And the greater uncertainty
about their borrowers' position (together
with the decline in average net worth of their
borrowers) means that lending through trade
credit will now be a more risky activity. Re-
duced lending on the part of banks (a result
of tighter supervision, the closure of many
banks, and the decreased net worth and in-
creased risk exposure of banks that remain
open) reinforces these effects (Greenwald
and Stiglitz, 1990b).
As noted earlier, the overall patterns ob-
served in East Asia closely match those pre-
dicted by these theories, with four additional
observations: First, earlier models focused on
closed economies. Because the East Asian
economies were open economies, some of the
price adjustments (such as the large increases
in interest rates) represented redistributions to
those outside the economy; there was thus an
aggregate-net-worth effect, which reinforced
the internal redistributive effect Greenwald
and I had earlier emphasized. Second, our
earlier models did not focus on the impact of
devaluations. As noted, risk-averse flrms
would typically have cover for their foreign-
exchange liabilities, so that devaluations
would help exporters. Under perfectly flexible
wages and prices, nontraded-goods industries
would be affected only in the intended way,
that is, through a shift of resources from the
nontraded to the traded sector. But with rela-
tive price rigidities, some nontraded-goods
firms may find their input prices rising faster
than the prices for the goods which they sell;
these firms may thus experience large negative
net-worth effects. Third, poor accounting
practices (i.e., a lack of transparency) in-
creased the uncertainty: not only were there on
average large changes in net worth, but it was
also difficult for suppliers of capital to ascer-
tain the magnitude of those changes. Fourth,
firms in East Asia were typically highly lev-
eraged, making them even more sensitive to
changes in interest rates. The high levels of
debt (especially short-term) were far greater
than could be explained by an interaction be-
tween rational risk-averse borrowers and ra-
tional risk-neutral or risk-averse lenders.
These deviations from expected behavior can
perhaps be interpreted as evidence of moral
hazard; lenders, both domestic and foreign, ap-
parently expected to be bailed out. (In cases
when the high levels of short-term debt and
low levels of transparency are important fea-
tures of the private-sector landscape, policy
should presumably take into account the fact
that large increases in interest rates may have
particularly large adverse effects.)
Note, however, that it was the large adjust-
ments in some prices that played as important
a role in propagating and amplifying the dis-
turbance as did the relative rigidity in other
prices. Would still greater flexibility of wages
and prices enable the economy to maintain it-
self at close to full employment? Not obvi-
ously: an increased pace of wage and price
adjustment, given the contractual rigidities al-
ready in place, would have led to even more
bankruptcies, greater erosion of net worth, and
a more adverse effect on aggregate supply.
Nor would indexing have fully resolved these
problems, given the large changes in relative
prices (e.g., real interest rates and exchange
rates).
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper has attempted to provide in-
sights into the three key macroeconomic
questions: Why do wages in the labor market
not adjust to clear the labor market? How can
we explain the magnitude of the changes in
the demand curve for labor., which seem to
necessitate such large changes in real wages
to equilibrate that market? And why do ad-
justments in person-hours take the form they
do. with a disproportionate share of the ad-
justment in downturns occurring in the form
of employment? In addressing these ques-
tions. I have unified the two alternative
strands in new-Keynesian economics, one
focusing on rigidities, the other on the
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adverse consequences of downward move-
ments in prices. I have argued that asym-
metries of adjustment and imperfections of
information are key; the asymmetries are
particularly pronounced between those mar-
kets (like assets) where auction processes
prevail and those in which firms engage in
price-setting. It is relative rigidities, not ab-
solute ones, that matter. In the case of
price-setting firms, a dynamic portfolio the-
ory of adjustment that (i) incorporates both
prices and quantities, (ii) takes into account
nonlinearities, fixed costs, and irreversibili-
ties, and (iii) incorporates signaling impacts
of changes and option values can explain not
only slow speeds of adjustment, but even ri-
gidities. (Specifically, it explains rigidities
ofthe sort where changes in the environment
lead to no change in firm behavior: for ex-
ample, because of kinks in the perceived de-
mand curves facing firms.) I have argued that
it is not just the price of goods and labor
relative to money that matters in determining
macroeconomic fluctuations; disturbances
("deviations from full equilibrium") of other
relative prices may matter even more.
The theory has, at the same time, strong pol-
icy implications. It agrees in some respects
with traditional Keynesian prescriptions and
differs in others, but most importantly it calls
attention to aspects of policy diat are too often
ignored and that have played out with a ven-
geance in East Asia. Falling wages and prices
(increased price flexibility) in the presence of
incomplete contracting may have negative im-
pacts that far outweigh positive real-balance
effects. Impacts on asset values and cash flows
of different policies have first-order effects.
Monetary policy has impacts not only through
channels traditionally emphasized, including
credit availability, but also through changes in
asset values and cash constraints facing firms.
Aggregate demand and aggregate supply are
intimately intertwined, so that demand shifts
that reduce the net worth of firms have signif-
icant impacts on aggregate supply in subse-
quent periods. The fact that these effects are
Ijersistent and hard to reverse in turn has strong
implications for the design of the appropriate
macroeconomic policies. While there is al-
ways some uncertainty about the future posi-
tion of the economy and the consequences of
altemative policies, risks are asymmetric. This
is perhaps one of the central lessons to emerge
from the crisis in East Asia.
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